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ZONING FOR AESTHETICS SUBSTANTIALLY
REDUCING PROPERTY VALUES
In recent years, courts in several jurisdictions have recognized that
the pleasant appearance of a community makes a direct and beneficial
contribution to the general welfare and that aesthetic considerations,
long considered insufficient to justify any restriction on private prop-
erty, may validly form the basis of a zoning ordinance.1 However any
zoning ordinance, regardless of its basis, is subject to fundamental con-
stitutional limitations which prohibit private property from being
taken for public use without just compensation.2 Accordingly, if an
aesthetically based ordinance subjects a small area to restrictions more
burdensome than those imposed on adjacent property, thereby causing
the value of the property affected to be diminished, the validity of such
an ordinance may be challenged. 3
In the recent decision of City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul, Min-
neapolis and Omaha Railway Co.,4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, upheld a zoning ordin-
ance based on aesthetic considerations which substantially reduced
the market value of a small areas while not similarly burdening adja-
2See, e.g., Cronwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967) (aesthetically based anti-billboard ordinance held valid); Oregon City v.
Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965) (aesthetically based anti-junkyard ordinance
held valid). Compare Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313,
78 N.W.2d 843 (1956) with City of Des Moines v. Lohner, - Iowa -, i68 N.W.2d
779 (1969). In Stoner McCray the court stated the traditional view that "aesthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity and
it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private
property without compensation." 78 N.W.2d at 848, citing City of Passaic v. Paterson
Billposting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (19o5). But many states will
still not permit aesthetics alone to justify a zoning ordinance. See Masotti and
Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URBAN L. 773 (1968).
2The United States Constitution provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use, without just compensation or the requisite due process of
law, U.S. CoNsr. amend. V; U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
3Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 16o S.E.2d 325 (1968); see Hannifin
Corp. v. City of Berwyn, s Ill. 2d 28. 115 N.E.2d 315 (953); ci. Skalko v. City of
Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. 2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939). See also I A. RATHKoPF, THE LAW
Or ZONING AND PLANNING, Ch. 6 (3 d ed. 1969).
'413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 478 (1969).
rThe fair market value of the property in question prior to the passage of
the ordinance was $32oooo and its value after the passage of the ordinance was
5150,ooo. 413 F.2d at 765.
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cent tracts. 6 The ordinance imposed a height restriction on property
owned by the railroad in order that structures would not be built
above the level of a nearby city park, thus insuring an aesthetically
desirable gateway7 to the core-renewal area of downtown St. Paul,
Minnesota.8
In reversing the district court's determination of invalidity,9 the
circuit court held that since the ordinance in question was based on
the legitimate police power objective of improving the appearance of
the downtown core-renewal area, it was within -the power of the city
to make reasonable regulations to promote this end. Such regulations
would not be invalidated unless an examination of the entire record
indicated that it was "possible to say that the legislative choice [was]
without rational basis."'1o Finding the ordinance in question to be
6The area immediately adjacent to the property in question had undergone
intensive development and many high rise buildings had been constructed or were
planned. Property within one hundred feet of the subject property was condemned
by the Housing Authority, the owner was paid compensation and the property
was sold to private interests as the site of a luxury high-rise apartment building.
Id. at 764.
'The property lies between two bridges across the Mississippi river and the
park "serves to open up the southern approach" to the downtown area which lies
to the north. Id. at 764.
8The property involved is situated at the foot of a sharp bluff, forty to ninety
feet below the level of a city park. The area surrounding the park is part of the
core-renewal area of downtown St. Paul and is undergoing rapid high rise de-
velopment. In 1963, the city realized that the railroad was attempting to sell this
property and feared that this sale would result in the erection of structures above
the level of the park. Consequently in 1966, the present ordinance was enacted
which effectively prohibited such an eventuality. Id. at 763-65.
"The district court in an unreported opinion found the ordinance to be
unreasonable and arbitrary because:
(i) it bore no substantial relationship to health, safety, morals or the gen-
eral welfare, and was enacted for aesthetic reasons only; (2) it was an
instance of spot zoning and not part of a comprehensive plan; and (3) it
was a confiscation without compensation in that the benefit to the public
was small in comparison to the detriment of the property owner. The
court concluded that the ordinance was "unconstitutional as violative of
due process of law."
Id. at 765-66.
"Id. at 766-67. In his dissent, Judge Mehaffy criticized the rationale of the
majority stating that:
[t]he specific premise of the majority opinion rests upon a patently
erroneous basis in that it completely overlooks the requirements of con-
stitutionality in its approach to this case ... [A] city, state or even the
Congress cannot validly invoke any ordinance or stitute regardless of its
"reasonableness, wisdom and propriety" if such ordinance or statute
violates fundamental provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 773-74 (dissenting opinion).
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reasonable, the court noted that it was adopted only after thorough
study coupled with a public hearing, and that the restriction was in
conformity with the comprehensive city plan." The fact that the sub-
ject property was substantially diminished in value was not deemed
sufficient to invalidate the ordinance. The court felt that the benefit
derived by the public from the pleasant appearance of the locality out-
weighed the loss suffered by the railroad. 12
Zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a legitimate police power
objective generally have been held constitutionally valid so long as
they are not unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or con-
fiscatory.' 3 The fact that the property involved may have been dimi-
nished in value has not been sufficient in itself to render an ordinance
invalid since individual property rights have always been subordinate
to the general welfare. 14 However, when compared with the benefit
derived by society from the restriction, the extent to which property
values are diminished is a significant indication of whether the ordin-
ance in question is reasonable.' 5 Other factors generally considered in
ascertaining the reasonableness and consequent validity of an ordin-
ance have been: the character of the neighborhood, the zoning classi-
"Id. at 768-69. Judge Mehaffy in his dissenting opinion disputed the existence
of a comprehensive plan for the tract in question, since the railroad property is
not within the redevelopment or renewal area of downtown St. Paul. Id. at 776
(dissenting opinion). See generally Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
1Id. at 767, 770.
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 565 (1926); Appeal of
Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533, 535 (1951); cf. McMahon v. City of Dubuque,
255 F.2d 154 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958). See generally, 1 A.
RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, Chs. 2-5 (3 d ed. 1969).
"McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953);
Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 5x8 (1952); see Stevens v.
Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 229 N.E.2d 591, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1967). See
also Miller v. Shoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
"Courts have not hesitated to uphold ordinances involving safety regulations.
See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); City of Marysville
v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1928). The same is true where an abate-
ment of a nuisance is concerned. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915). In these situations the ordinances were upheld even though there was
substantial reduction in the market value of the property. Where, however, the
benefit to the public is small compared to the burden imposed on the the indi-
vidual property owner, the ordinance will be invalidated. See Stevens v. Town
of Huntington, 2o N.Y.2d 352, 229 N.E.2d 591, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1967); Vernon
Park Realty v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517, 125 N.Y.S.2d 112
(1954); cf. Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson, 200 So. 2d 335 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
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fication and use of nearby property, and the motivation behind a
particular ordinance. 16
Whenever the enactment of an ordinance based primarily or ex-
clusively on aesthetics has caused substantial diminution in property
values, courts in Minnesota 17 and elsewhere' s have tended to invali-
date such restrictions, reasoning that the aesthetic enhancement of the
community does not promote the general welfare sufficiently to justify
diminishing or destroying valuable property interests. But the recent
recognition in several jurisdictions, including Minnesota, that the
pleasant appearance of a locality promotes the general welfare seems
to partially undermine the authority of -these earlier decisions. 19 These
more recent decisions, however, did not involve substantial reduction
in property values, consequently they are distinguishable from the
earlier cases.
20
In situations where zoning ordinances based solely or predomin-
antly on aesthetic considerations have been upheld, courts generally
have stated that the exercise of the police power in this area is not un-
limited, and that if a municipality exceeds reasonable bounds in the
singular pursuit of an aesthetically pleasing locality, the restrictions
involved will be invalidated as constituting "unreasonable devices of
implementing community policy."2' 1 Ordinances based upon aesthetics,
"La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. 2d 497, 192 N.E.2d 909 (1963);
Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951).
"'Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583 (1963);
Golden v. City of St. Louis Park, 266 Minn. 46, 122 N.W.2d 570 (1963); Pearce
v. City of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962); Olsen v. City of Minnea-
polis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962).
"Barney v. Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 44o, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949);
Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943); Cleveland Trust Co.
v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 11o N.E.2d 44o (1952).
"Compare Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn.
492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968) with Pearce v. City of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118
N.W.2d 659 (1962) and Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d
734 (1962). See also Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955);
State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
-1Cases cited note 19 supra.
2'People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734,
738, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); see Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35,
400 P.2d 255 (1965). See generally Cronwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d
749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). In upholding an anti-billboard ordinance based solely on
aesthetics, the court in Cromwell noted that not any aesthetic consideration will
justify a zoning ordinance.
The exercise of the police power should not extend to every artistic con-
formity or non-conformity. Rather what is involved are those aesthetic
considerations which bear substantially on the economic, social and cul-
CASE COMMENTS
heretofore declared valid, have also had a very limited effect on private
property values, imposing burdens on the landowner more in the
nature of an inconvenience than a hardship and causing little or no
diminution in property value.22 These ordinances, furthermore, have
been confined generally to restrictions eliminating uses which are par-
ticularly offensive and unsightly, such as automobile wrecking yards23
and billboards, 4 or have been concerned with the promotion of
tourism2r or the preservation of historic areas.20
By permitting a municipality to implement an aesthetically based
ordinance which substantially reduced the market value of a small
area by restricting permissible building heights, the court in City of
St. Paul has extended the narrow limits accorded prior ordinances
founded on aesthetic considerations. 27 Such ordinances have previously
been confined to the restriction of uses highly offensive in nature, such
as billboards and junkyards,2 8 which are clearly distinguishable from
the structure contemplated for the property involved in the instant
case.20 More significantly, the court has sanctioned a diminution in
property value considerably greater than heretofore permitted in the
furtherance of an aesthetic objective. 30
tural patterns of a community or district.... The eye is entitled to as
much recognition as the other senses, but of course, the offense to the
eye must be substantial and be deemed to have material effect on the
community or district pattern.
Id. at 752, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 3o.
!Cases cited note 21 supra.
Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
2'State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., - Hawaii -, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Cromwell
v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
2City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 141 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
"City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
"Cases cited notes 21-25 supra.
2Cases cited notes 23 & 24 supra.
"'A study made by the railroad for the purpose of ascertaining the highest
and best use for the property determined that a motel and four high rise apart-
ments should be constructed on the property. These structures would be similar
to those located on or contemplated for nearby tracts. 413 F.2d at 764-65.
When vacant land is taken by eminent domain, it is valued at its highest
and best use which means that "[t]he measure of compensation is the market
value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration its value for building
purposes if that is its most available use." J. SACKMAN, 4 NIcHoLs' ON EMINENT
DossAIN § 12.3142[1], at 181 (rev. 3 d ed. 1962). See also U.S. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
mThe court in effect allowed a fifty-three per cent decrease in property value.
413 F.2d at 765. In other situations where aesthetically based ordinances were
upheld, no diminution in market value of property was involved; the only loss
resulted from the inability to erect a billboard or to operate a junkyard. see, e.g.,
Cronwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
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The only apparent limitation imposed by the court in City of St.
Paul is that the restriction be reasonable; however, the determination
of what is reasonable is in effect left generally to the city government.3'
This approach seems to grant considerable discretion to municipal
planning officials which may be necessary since the subjective, inde-
finable nature of aesthetic considerations makes "objective classifica-
tions and standards ...particularly difficult to establish."32 Yet re-
quiring a municipality to show precisely the extent to which an aes-
thetic objective benefits the public could severely limit the scope of
the zoning power in the area of aesthetics and render many ordinances
invalid solely because of an inability to meet this indefinite standard
of proof.33
The utilization of this test, however, presupposes that municipal
planning officials, who have the primary responsibility for developing
the city in a manner that meets the public needs and who presumably
are in the best position to ascertain those needs, will act reasonably.3 4
These officials may not, in fact, always act reasonably, and in an area
such as aesthetics where the basic values involved are subjective and
intangible the likelihood that private property may be subjected to
arbitrary and discriminatory regulation becomes increasingly prob-
able.aS
This potential for abuse seems apparent from the situation in City
31413 F.2d at 767. See Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
The court in Hartke, followed this same approach in upholding an ordinance which
for aesthetic reasons excluded automobile wrecking yards from the city. It should
be noted, however, that in Hartke there was no diminution in property values as
a result of the ordinance, and the court felt no need to impose strict limitations
on the action of the city where aesthetics were concerned. The court reasoned that:
[t]he city commission has the responsibility for the planning and develop-
ment of the city in a manner that meets the needs of the community. The
commission may interpret those needs as including the elimination of uses
which are not in keeping with the character of the city as it then exists
or as the community would desire it to be in the future.
Id. at 43, 400 P.2d at 263.
3 Norton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW, 171, 182
(1967); see Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 2o LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955).
"T'his factor has caused many courts to hold all ordinances based on aesthetics
invalid. See, e.g., Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 4o8 Ill. 91, 96 NE.2d
499 (1951); Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951).
"See Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetanka, 281 Minn. 492, 162
N.W.2d 206 (1968); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
"See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393 (1922). In Mahon Mr.
Justice Holmes stated that:
[t]he protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken
for public use without compensation .... When this seemingly absolute
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of St. Paul. Since the instant ordinance not only placed the railroad's
property in a more restrictive zone than the surrounding realtybut
also substantially reduced its value,36 it may be possible that the ordin-
ance constituted an instance of discriminatory "spo" zoning.37 A
"spot" zoning ordinance may be held valid only where the gain to
the public is substantial, clearly offsetting the hardship imposed on the
property owner affected. 38 Since the court apparently was unable to
calculate the public gain resulting from the maintenance of an aes-
thetically desirable gateway to the downtown area, it ignored the pos-
sible "spot" zoning issue and upheld the ordinance since it was found
to be reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare.39
The granting of considerable discretion to municipal authorities
to enact aesthetically based ordinances may be satisfactory in situa-
tions where there is little or no resultant diminution in property
value and the uses restricted are particularly ugly and unsightly.40
But in situations where there is some doubt as to the offensiveness of a
particular structure and substantial reduction in value is involved,
municipal discretion should be curtailed in order that basic constitu-
protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more
until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished
in this way under the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 415. See generally Gooder, Brakes for the Beauty Bus, A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS,
JUNKYARDS, GERANIUMs, JURIsPRUDENCE: AESTHETICS AND THE LAw (June 2-3, 1967).
1413 F.2d at 764.
7"Spot" zoning is the practice whereby a small area or individual lot has
burdens imposed upon it which are not imposed upon adjacent, similarly situated
property. i A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING Ch. 26 (3d ed. 1969).
There has been some confusion as to the meaning of the term "spot" zoning. It
has been used as a legal term expressing a conclusion of law and any finding that
an ordinance is in effect spot zoning, generally has invalidated it. See, e.g., Rogers
v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). The term also has
been used in a descriptive sense to describe a situation where a small area has
been zoned differently from surrounding property. See, e.g., Pennings v. Owens,
340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W.2d 831 (1954). It has even been held that because of the
recognized corrosive effects of spot zoning ordinances, the ordinary presumption of
legislative resonableness is neutralized and the burden is on the municipality to
justify the ordinance. See, e.g., Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 38o, 406
P.2d 545 (1965).
3Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 454, 327 P.2d 1o (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958); Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, I Ill. 2d 28, 115 N.E.2d 315 (1953);
see La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill. 2d 344, 125 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
'Judge Mehaffey in his dissent criticizes the majority for ignoring "the delib-
erate and obviously discriminatory spot zoning in the instand case," stating that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the enactment of spot zoning
ordinances which result in the substantial diminution of the value of the property
affected without just compensation constitutes a taking of property without due
process. 413 F.2d at 777 (dissenting opinion).
'0Cases cited notes 21-24 supra.
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tional rights of individual property owners are not violated.4 1
The city could have used its power of eminent domain,42 paid just
compensation to the railroad and sold the restricted property with the
height restriction to a private developer.4 3 If this method had been
utilized, the aesthetic objectives of the city could have been maximized
while allowing the property owner just compensation. This would
cause the general public, who realize the ultimate benefits from the
ordinance, to bear the cost of improving the appearance of the
locality.
44
As increasing pressure is placed on municipal governments to
create a pleasing and viable urban environment, there may be further
tendency for municipalities to stretch the constitutional limitations of
their zoning powers. The desire to attain the maximum possible bene-
fit for ,the community at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer may
cause serious invasion of private property rights. In the realm of zon-
ing ordinances based upon aesthetics where the tangible benefits to the
public are difficult to measure, 45 the limits of the police power should
be more precisely defined in order to insure that both public and priv-
ate interests are fairly balanced.
JOHN B. KING, JR.
"'There must be some limiting framework in order to protect the rights of
property owners from the action of well-meaning but misdirected municipal
officials. See Norton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 171
(1967). See also People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 24o N.Y.S.2d 734
(dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
Eminent domain is generally defined as the power of a governmental unit
to "condemn private property for public use, and to appropriate the ownership
and possession thereof for such use upon paying the owner a due compensation."
City of Knoxville v. Heth, 186 Tenn. 321, 210 S.W.2d 326, 328 (1948).
"'Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The decision in Berman permitted the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Agency to acquire by eminent domain real
property which in turn would be sold or leased to purchasers on the condition
that they carry out the redevelopment plan. This plan was held to be valid even
though its primary purpose was aesthetics-to make the community more attractive.
Id. at 29-30, 33. See also Searles, Aesthetics in the Law, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
607 (1967).
"In this situation the city could also have taken a development easement
which would have prohibited development above a certain height. If this method
had been utilized the city would not have had to compensate the railroad for
that portion of the $32oooo value of the land which came from proximity to the
adjacent urban renewal area, since government action, the creation of the urban
renewal area, may have increased the value of the property. See U.S. v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943). See also Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain:
Irreverence for Unconstitutional Practice, 3o U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1963); 43
IOWA L. REV. 303 (1958).
""Beauty is a matter neither subject to rational criticism nor capable of
measurement by precise standards...." Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives:
A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PeOB. 218, 225 (1955).
